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THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE - Should Mississippi Courts Con-
sider Seat Belt Nonuse as Evidence of a Failure to Mitigate
Damages?
INTRODUCTION
A substantial number of automobile accidents occur each year
in which a seat belt is not in use.1 The economic loss from these
accidents reaches well into the billions of dollars annually.2 A
major objective behind the use of seat belts is to prevent not only
the second collision3 on the interior of the car, but also to keep
the occupant from being ejected from the car on impact.4 That
the use of an available safety belt is one of the single most effec-
tive measures to protect an occupant in the event of an automo-
bile collision is rarely doubted. The "seat belt defense" was
developed with these thoughts in mind.5
In Mississippi the seat belt defense has not been addressed by
the Mississippi Supreme Court since early 1971 when the defense
was denied under a comparative negligence theory.6 The purpose
of this comment is to address the issue of whether evidence of
the plaintiffs nonuse of an available and fully operational seat
belt should be admissible in Mississippi as evidence of a failure
to mitigate damages.' Although numerous articles have been
I. In 1983, 34,840 persons died in automobile related accidents in the United States. Seat belts were in
use in 2,333 of the cases. There were 26,186 cases in which seat belts were not in use and 6,321 cases in
which it was unknown whether seat belts were in use. In Mississippi, the percentage of cases in which seat
belts were not in use in automobile related accidents was just as great. Out of 613 total occupant fatalities
in 1983, there were no confirmed cases of seat belt usage. Telephone interview with Ms. Lou Ann Hall, Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Information Management Services Division (Feb. 26, 1985).
2. The economic loss to society from motor vehicle accidents which occurred in 1980 is estimated to have
been $57.2 billion. See NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTA-
TION, THE ECONOMIC COST TO SOCIETY OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS (1983).
3. "Second collision" generally refers to the collision between a passenger and an interior part of the vehi-
cle following an accident. It has also been applied to ejection cases in which the second collision is between
the occupant of the car and the ground. See, e.g. Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349 (M.D.Pa. 1978), affd
without opinion, 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979).
4. It has been estimated that the chance of full body ejection is increased by 500% and that nearly 80%
of all ejectees would have survived the collision by using a lap seat belt. Bowman, Practical Defense Problems
- The Trial Lawyer's View, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 191, 196 (1970).
5. The origin of the seat belt defense has been traced to the unreported decision of Stockinger v. Dunisch,
Sheboygon County Cir.Ct. (Wis. 1964) discussed in 5 FOR THE DEFENSE 79 (1964). The principle behind
the seat belt defense is to relieve the defendant from liability for those injuries to the plaintiff that an available
seat belt would have prevented had one been in use.
6. D.W. Boutwell Butane Co. v. Smith, 244 So. 2d II (Miss. 1971).
7. The defense was first used to establish that the failure to use a seat belt was evidence of contributory
negligence whereby the plaintiff would be completely precluded from recovery. This theory has been rejected
by most courts for two reasons. First, neither the common law nor state statutes requiring the installation of
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written on the defense, recent developments in the law necessi-
tate further analysis.'
Section one of this comment reviews the Mississippi cases in
which the seat belt defense has been discussed. Section two iden-
tifies the different positions courts have traditionally taken when
presented with the defense and a rule in Mississippi which, until
recently, would defeat the defense. Section three analyzes recent
legislation on seat belt use, particularly the various provisions deal-
ing with noncompliance to determine the future impact on the seat
belt defense.
THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE IN MISSISSIPPI
The first interpretation of the seat belt defense in Mississippi
occurred in Petersen v. Klos.' In Petersen, applying Mississippi
law in a wrongful death action, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court, which had found the defendant guilty of contributory
negligence for failing to use an available seat belt. ' ° The lower
court had determined that a causal connection existed between
the plaintiffs injuries and the nonuse of the seat belt. Since there
was no authority in Mississippi on the effect of a failure to wear
a seat belt, the district court had to determine how a Mississippi
court would rule if it were faced with the issue.
Although the circuit court held the question was "properly be-
fore the district court, as an affirmative defense,"'" the district
court did not have to answer the question because it found that
the element of a causal connection between the plaintiffs injuries
and the nonuse of seat belts had not been established. However,
seat belts create a duty to use seat belts. Second, the failure to wear a seat belt does not cause the accident
that gives rise to the injury. See Tempe v. Giacco, 37 Conn. Supp. 120, 442 A.2d 947 (1981); Brown v. Ken-
drick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Mount v. McClellan, 91 Ill. App. 2d 1, 234 N.E.2d 329
(1968): Benson v. Seagraves, 445 So. 2d 187 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App.
119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Barry v. Coca-Cola
Co., 99 N.J. Super. 270. 239 A.2d 273 (1967): Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 323
N.E.2d 164 (1974); Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. 1974): Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 9 (1979).
8. Additional articles addressing the subject include: Huelke, Practical Defense Problems - The Experts
View, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 203 (1970); Kircher, The Seat Belt Defense -State of the Law, 53 MARQ. L. REV.
172 (1970): Kleist, The Seat Belt Defense -An Erercise in Sophistry, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 613 (1967); Snyder,
The Seat Belt Defense As A Cause of Injury, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 211 (1970); Werber. A Multi-Disciplinary
Approach to Seat Belt Issues. 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 217 (1980); Note, The Seat Bell Defense: A Comprehen-
sive Guide for the Trial Lawyer and Suggested Approach for the Courts, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 272 (1980);
Note, The Seat Belt Defense: Should Coloradoans Buckle Up For Safety?, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 375 (1979).
9. 426 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
10. Id.
1I. Id. at 203.
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in dicta, the court of appeals cited the complete lack of record
evidence "concerning the safety value of seat belts" 12 and stated
that "[b]efore this new safety device can be said to modify the
standard of ordinary care, there must be some consensus to its
utility." 13
The second application of the defense also concerned a federal
case, Glover v. Daniels." In Glover, another wrongful death suit,
the district court determined that there was insufficient evidence
to submit the issue to the jury. However, it did recognize that
the seat belt defense would be appropriate under a proper record.
The court stated:
The burden was upon defendant to show that the failure of decedent to use the seat belt
was a factor which contributed to his injuries. In other words, defendant had the burden
to show by substantial evidence that decedent would not have suffered terminal injuries,
if he had fastened the seat belt. Since the failure to fasten the seat belt could not have
been a contributing cause of the collision, it was incumbent upon defendant to show by
substantial evidence that such failure aggravated the injuries that decedent would other-
wise have suffered. Conjecture and surmisel will not suffice."
Once again a federal court was confronted with determining
how the state court would resolve the question if it were faced
with the issue. In its effort to determine the status of the defense
in Mississippi, the district court cited the Mississippi case of Rivers
v. Carpenter6 as the only case making any reference to seat belts.
The file of the Rivers case indicated that seat belt instructions had
been granted to the defendant and that the jury considered the
nonuse as evidence of contributory negligence. However, the
granting of instructions was not assigned as error on appeal; thus,
the issue was not considered by the court.17
Only one case concerning the seat belt defense has been before
the Mississippi Supreme Court, D. W. Boutwell Butane Compa-
ny v. Smith,18 which was heard the year following Petersen and
Glover. The court rejected an argument that the defendant was
entitled to an instruction either finding the plaintiff guilty of com-
parative negligence as a matter of law or submitting the question
to the jury for decision. 9 Once again no evidence was offered
to establish a causal connection between plaintiffs injuries and
12. Id. at 204.
13. Id.
14. 310 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
15. Id. at 761.
16. 203 So. 2d 574 (Miss. 1967).
17. Glover, 310 F. Supp. at 753.
18. 244 So. 2d II (Miss. 1971).
19. Id.
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the nonuse of a seat belt. Indeed, the only evidence came from
the plaintiff "who admitted the belts were there and that she un-
derstood that if the belt were 'properly' adjusted they might con-
tribute to her safety. This was merely a conclusion of the young
lady unsupported by any evidence or facts."2 Nevertheless, the
court did not reject the holding of Glover- that the defense is avail-
able in Mississippi under a proper record.
THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE UNDER THE MITIGATION THEORY
Just as the seat belt defense has been rejected under a theory
of contributory negligence,21 attempts under a comparative negli-
gence basis have met with similar results. 2 The primary reason
for the rejection is that both address the issue of liability. Only
in the most unusual situation will the failure to wear a seat belt
be the proximate cause of the accident.23 Under the mitigation the-
ory, nonuse of the seat belt is addressed to the issue of damages
rather than the issue of liability. Those jurisdictions which have
traditionally accepted the seat belt defense have done so primari-
ly under this theory." Despite the acceptance by some courts, the
20. Id. at 12. Further language indicates that the decision was based on an inadequate evidentiary record.
The court stated: "There are many factors to be considered as to [the use of seat belts]. So many questions
as to the efficacy of seat belts remain unanswered that we are unwilling now to lay down a rule that the failure
to use them is negligence." 244 So. 2d at 12.
2 1. See supra note 7.
22. See, e.g., Schmitzer v. Misener-Bennett Ford, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Amend
v. Bell, 570 P.2d 138 (Wash. 1977); Annot.. 95 A.L.R.3d 239 (1979). Comparative negligence has been adopted
in one form or another in 40 states. As of early 1983. the ten remaining contributory negligence jurisdictions
were Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina. Tennes-
see, and Virginia. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 67 (5th ed. 1984).
23. See, e.g., Curry v. Moser, 89 A.D.2d I. 454 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1982).
In Curry. the plaintiff fell out of the passenger door of the vehicle as it was turning and was struck by another
vehicle. She was not wearing a seat belt and testified that she had not touched nor leaned against the door.
At trial, it was established that when the plaintiff had tried the door that morning it would not open, and the
plaintiff had to enter the car through the driver's door. While the car was in motion, the plaintiff turned side-
ways with her back to the door to talk with a back seat passenger. The court found under these circumstances
that plaintiffs failure to wear a seat belt could be evidence of contributory negligence noting that this exception
to the general rule occurs when plaintiffs failure is alleged to be a cause of the accident.
24. Cases accepting seat belt evidence to mitigate damages are: Truman v. Vargas, 275 Cal. App. 976,
80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lafferty, 451 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1984); Insurance Co. of
North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984); Old Second National Bank v. Bauman, 86 111. App.
3d 547, 408 N.E.2d 224 (1980); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974);
Brodvin v. Hertz Corp., 487 F. Supp. 1336; (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Benner v. Interstate Container Corp., 73 F.R.D.
502 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Prits v. Walter Lowery Trucking Co., 400 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Bentzler
v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967). See also Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 1033 (1977).
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majority of courts that have addressed the issue have denied the
use of seat belt evidence in mitigation of damages.2
According to Prosser, the plaintiffs duty to mitigate damages
stems from the doctrine of avoidable consequences, which de-
nies recovery for any damages that could have been avoided by
reasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff. 6 Under this basis
the defendant would not be liable for those injuries which a seat
belt would have prevented. Ordinarily, however, the doctrine has
been applied to post-accident conduct. Opponents of the seat belt
defense argue that to apply the doctrine to seat belt use would
impose a preaccident obligation upon the plaintiff and would deny
him the right to assume the due care of others. 7
A theory of apportionment, comparable to mitigation, is recog-
nized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 465. Refer-
ring to the causal connection between harm and the plaintiffs
negligence, Comment c states:
Such apportionment may also be made where the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff
is found not to contribute in any way to the original accident or injury, but to be a substan-
tial contributing factor in increasing the harm which ensues. There must of course be satis-
factory evidence to support such a finding, and the court may properly refuse to permit
the apportionment on the basis of mere speculation."
The Restatement theory was accepted in Pritts v. Walter Low-
ery Trucking Company9 and by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
25. Cases rejecting seat belt evidence to mitigate damages are: Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 242
So. 2d 666 (1970): Nash v. Kamrath. 21 Ariz.App. 530. 521 P.2d 161 (1974): Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo.
392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973): Lipscomb v. Diamiani. 226 A.2d 914 (Del. 1967): McCord v. Green. 362 A.2d
720 (App. D.C. 1970): State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 1981); Hampton v. State Highway Comm'n.,
209 Kan. 565. 498 P.2d 236 (1972): Taplin v. Clark, 6 Kan. App. 2d 66, 626 P.2d 1198 (1981); Romankewiz
v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119. 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228. 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968);
Roberts v. Bohn, 26 Ohio App. 2d 50. 269 N.E.2d 53, revd on other grounds. 29 Ohio St. 2d 99, 279 N.E.2d
878 (1971); Fields v. Volkswagen of America. Inc.. 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976): Amend v. Bell, 570 P.2d
138 (Wash. 1977).
26. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON. THE LAW OF TORiTS § 67 (5th ed. 1984), see also 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages
§ 200 (1965).
27. See, e.g.. Kleist. 18 HASTINGS L. 613, 616 (1967). But see Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 363
N.Y.S.2d 916, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974). In Spier, the court of appeals addressed this very issue and stated:
We concede that the opportunity to mitigate damages prior to the occurrence of an accident does not
ordinarily arise, and that the chronological distinction on which the concept of mitigation rests, is justified
in most cases. However, in our opinion, the seat belt affords the automobile occupant an unusual and
ordinarily unavailable means by which he or she may minimize his or her damages prior to the acci-
dent. Highway safety has become a national concern, we are told to drive defensively and to "watch
out for the other driver." When an automobile occupant may readily protect himself, at least partially,
from the consequences of a collision, we think that the burden of buckling an available seat belt may.
under the facts of the particular case, be found by the jury to be less than the likelihood of injury
when multiplied by its accompanying severity.
Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 452. 363 N.Y.S.2d at 922. 323 N.E.2d at 168.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 465, Comment c (1965).
29. 400 F. Supp. 867 (1975).
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in Bentzler v. Braun3" where the court held that "in those cases
where seat belts are available and there is evidence before the
jury indicating causal relationship between the injuries sustained
and the failure to wear seat belts, it is proper and necessary to
instruct the jury in that regard."31
Two additional "hybrid" theories, similar to the mitigation the-
ory, have recently been articulated. 2 The first, labelled the "ex-
ceptional circumstances" theory,33 has been recommended for
adoption as a good compromise between those views that have
permitted seat belt evidence and those that have not."4 The se-
cond theory becomes operative in wrongful death actions.35
Numerous reasons have been expressed by the courts in op-
position to the seat belt defense under a mitigation of damages
theory. Common reasons include: (1) although statutes require
the installation of safety belt equipment in new automobiles, there
are no statutory requirements that seat belts be used by the occu-
pant;36 (2) if the evidence is allowed the same result would be
reached as if comparative negligence were applied;37 (3) the com-
parison of the defendant's negligence with the plaintiffs failure
to wear a seat belt would lead to jury confusion and speculation;38
and (4) the matter is best suited for legislative resolution. 9
At the root of all decisions rejecting the seat belt defense there
appears to be a reluctance by the courts to impose a duty upon
the plaintiff to wear a seat belt.4" When the accident is caused
by the defendant's negligent conduct it is understandable that a
court would not want to diminish the plaintiffs recovery simply
30. 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
31. Id. at 387, 149 N.W.2d at 640.
32. See 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. at 278.
33. Under this theory a plaintiffs nonuse of an available safety bell is admissible where exceptional circum-
stances indicate that a belt should have been used. In Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968),
the court stated:
Conceivably a situation could arise in which a plaintiffs failure to have his seat belt buckled at the
time he was injured would constitute negligence. It would, however, have to be a situation in which
the plaintiff, with prior knowledge of a specific hazard-one not generally associated with highway
travel and one from which a seat belt would have protected him-had failed or refused to fasten his
seat belt.
Id. at 234, 160 S.E.2d at 70.
34. 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. at 291.
35. The wrongful death theory has been applied by a court which recognized a distinction between causes
of actions for injuries and causes for wrongful death. In a wrongful death action the use of an available seat
belt could prevent the extreme result of death. See Noth v. Scheurer. 285 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
36. See, e.g.. Taplin v. Clark, 6 Kan. App. 2d 66, 626 P.2d 1198 (1981). Butsee note 72 infra and accom-
panying text.
37. See, e.g., Britton v. Dochring, 287 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970).
38. See, e.g.. Fischer v. Moore, 18 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973).
39. See, e.g., Schmitzer v. Misener-Bennett Ford, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. App. 1984).
40. See, e.g., cases listed at note 25 supra.
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because a seat belt was not in use at the time of the accident. In
addition, it has been noted that the problem before the court con-
cerns a comparison between the defendant's active negligence and
the plaintiffs passive negligence.' Although the court should avoid
granting the defendant a windfall, the argument in behalf of the
seat belt defense is not without merit.
It is important to note that the seat belt defense is applicable
to products liability actions as well as ordinary negligence actions.42
Under a normal fact situation the dialogue assumes a predictable
form. The defendant will argue that the plaintiff has a duty to
conduct himself as a reasonable man of ordinary prudence would
under the same or similar circumstances.43 Further, because
automobile accidents are foreseeable,44 defendant will argue that
a reasonable man would wear a seat belt while driving an
automobile. To this statement the plaintiff would respond that since
the ordinary person does not wear a seat belt, the failure to use
an available seat belt cannot be evidence of unreasonable con-
duct.45 The turning point in resolving these arguments in seat belt
cases hinges on the establishment of a sufficient causal connec-
tion between the injuries and the nonuse of the available seat belt.
In Florida an effective approach for addressing the causation
issue has been established. Florida departed from its rule denying the
seat belt defense, announced in Brown v. Kendrick,4" in the recent
case of Insurance Company of North America v. Pasakarnis. 4 ' In
Insurance Company of North America, the court ruled- that evidence
41. See, e.g., Note, The Seat Belt Defense Under Comparative Negligence, 12 IDAHO L. REv. 59, 64 (1975);
Note, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. at 289.
42. The status of the seat belt defense in products liability actions is as much in a state of flux as in ordinary
personal injury suits. Often the argument is made that the design of an automobile must be considered as a
whole to determine the crashworthiness of a vehicle. Further, if the plaintiff is alleging a design defect, since
safety belts are installed as a safety feature, the nonuse of a seat belt is obviously relevant. See McCleod v.
American Motors Corp., 723 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1984) (defense inadmissible where expert testified that injury
would have been more serious had seat belts been used); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511 (6th
Cir. 1983) (restrained from answering since status of state law was so much in doubt); Hermann v. General
Motors Corp., 720 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1983) (admissible); Ciazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 468 F. Supp.
593 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). affd in part, revdon other grounds, 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981) (admissible); Wilson
v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978) (admissible); Horn v. General Motors
Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78, (1976) (inadmissible); McElroy v. Allstate Insurance
Co., 420 So. 2d 214 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 422 So. 2d 165 (La. 1982) (admissible); Schmitzer
v. Misener-Bennet Ford, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (inadmissible); DeGraat v. General
Motors Corp., 352 N.W.2d 719 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (inadmissible).
43. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 283 (1965).
44. See Insurance Co. of North America, 451 So. 2d at 453.
45. See, e.g., McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720 (App. D.C. 1976); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160
S.E.2d 65 (1968); Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977).
46. 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). Brown, often cited for the view that the seat belt defense
is inadmissible, had long been the rule in Florida that there is no duty to wear a seat belt and that the issue
is best suited for legislative resolution.
47. 451 So. 2d at 447.
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of a plaintiffs failure to use an available and fully operational seat
belt is a factor which the jury can consider in assessing damages. 8
A companion case to Insurance Company of North America, All-
state Insurance Company v. Lafferty, was also quashed on the
authority of Insurance Company of North America.49
Insurance Company of North America illustrates the awareness
that seat belts are an effective means of preventing the frequency
and severity of injuries in automobile accident cases." The opin-
ion is important because the court does not absolutely reject the
theory that the failure to wear an available seat belt may be evi-
dence of unreasonable conduct. Under the new theory in Flori-
da, nonuse of a seat belt is evidence of unreasonable conduct when
(1) the defendant satisfies his burden of pleading and proving the
plaintiffs failure to use the seat belt; (2) the nonuse is a proxi-
mate cause of the accident;"' and (3) competent evidence proves
the nonuse produced or contributed substantially to producing at
least a portion of the plaintiffs damages.52
The dissent in the district court opinion provided the rationale
for the decision to allow the seat belt defense.
[T]he failure to expend the minimal effort required to fasten an available safety device
which has been put there specifically in order to reduce or avoid injuries from a subse-
quent accident is, on the very face of the matter, obviously pertinent and thus should be
deemed admissible in an action for damages, part of which would not have been sustained
if the seat belt had been used."
Another feature of the Florida approach is a conscious effort
to avoid jury confusion by using a series of interrogatories to dis-
tinguish between a person's negligent contribution to the accident
as opposed to the negligent contribution to his damages." Utili-
48. id.
49. 451 So. 2d 446 (1984).
50. See notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text.
51. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
52. 451 So. 2d at 454.
53. Insurance Co. of North America, 451 So. 2d at 453 (quoting Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakar-
nis, 425 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Schwartz, J., dissenting)).
54. The following interrogatories are added to the verdict form in automobile cases:
(a) Did defendant prove that the plaintiff failed to use reasonable care under the circumstances by
failing to use an available and fully operational seat belt?
yes no
If your answer to question (a) is no, you should not proceed further except to date and sign this
verdict form and return it to the courtroom. If your answer to question (a) is yes, please answer ques-
tion (b).
(b) Did defendant prove that plaintiffs failure to use an available and fully operational seat belt
produced or contributed substantially to producing at least a portion of the plaintiffs damages?
yes no
If your answer to question (b) is no, you should not proceed further except to date and sign this
verdict form and return it to the courtroom. If your answer to question (b) is yes, please answer ques-
tion (c).
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zation of the interrogatories addresses the criticism that the seat
belt defense only serves to confuse the jury.5"
A major criticism of the seat belt defense centers around the
anticipated proliferation of seat belt experts that will spring up
to establish the causal connection between the plaintiffs failure
to use a seat belt and the ensuing injuries. 6 One additional con-
cern expressed in Insurance Company of North America 7 is that
the result is unsatisfactory because it focuses the attention on the
plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt when the purpose of the trial
is to establish liability on the defendant for his tortious conduct
in causing the accident."
ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION EXPERTS IN MISSISSIPPI
Expert testimony to establish a causal connection is a universal
requirement in those decisions that have adopted the seat belt
defense.59 Yet, until the Mississippi Supreme Court recently
decided Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Company," testimony
by an accident reconstruction expert was inadmissible in Missis-
sippi under the ultimate issue rule.6 This rule, had it remained
in effect, would defeat the seat belt defense prior to an analysis
of the defense on the merits. By overruling Hagan,6" Mississippi
joined the majority position which allows testimony by accident
reconstruction experts.6
(c) What percentage of plaintiffs total damages were caused by his (or her) failure to use an availa-
ble and fully operational seat belt?
451 So. 2d at 454.
55. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
56. It has been suggested that expert testimony will be required to offer substantial evidence in the follow-
ing areas: (1) the crash behavior of the vehicle; (2) the trajectory of the plaintiffs body in the crash; (3) the
relationship of the vehicle crash event to occupant kinematics; (4) the particular injuries suffered; (5) the trajectory
which a restrained occupant would have taken; and (6) the extent of lesser injuries which the restrained oc-
cupant would have sustained as a result of the impacts he would have made with the vehicle. Bowman, Practi-
cal Defense Problems - The Trial Lawyer's View, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 191, 197-202 (1970).
57. 451 So. 2d 447 (1984).
58. Id. at 456 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
59. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
60. 465 So. 2d 311 (Miss. 1985).
61. See, e.g., Gandy v. State, 373 So. 2d 1042 (Miss. 1979); Arrow Ford Distributor, Inc. v. Love, 361
So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1978); Lynch v. Suthoff, 220 So. 2d 593 (Miss. 1969); Jones v. Welford, 215 So. 2d 240
(Miss. 1968); Hagan Storm Fence Co. v. Edwards, 245 Miss. 487, 148 So. 2d 693 (1963); Schumpert v.
Watson, 241 Miss. 199, 129 So. 2d 627 (1961).
Hagan had been the key case in Mississippi denying the introduction of testimony by an accident reconstruc-
tion expert, or accidentologist. Two reasons were offered for the rule. First, it was held that testimony such
as this invaded the province of the jury. Second, the introduction of opinion evidence by the accidentologist
amounts to a violation of the right to trial by jury because it is the function of the jury to make fact determinations.
62. Hollingsworth, 465 So. 2d at 311.
63. Id., 9c BLASHFIELD CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 6316 (Supp. 1964); MCCOR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE § 12 (E. Cleary ed. 1984).
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In Hollingsworth," Rita Hollingsworth was killed when her car
collided with a truck driven by Anthony Frazier. At trial Frazier
testified that as he viewed the Hollingsworth car coming towards
him he brought his vehicle to a virtual stop on the north edge of
the road, the alleged point of impact. Frazier's wife, the only re-
maining eyewitness, corroborated the testimony.65 Hollingsworth's
attorney attempted to introduce the testimony of Medina, an ac-
cident reconstruction expert, who testified that there would have
been no way for the vehicles to come to rest as they did if Frazier's
truck had been stopped on the north edge of the road. However,
objections to the testimony were sustained and the jury returned
a verdict for the defense.6 Holding that the new rule in Missis-
sippi only puts automobile collision litigants on an equal footing
with other litigants, the court reversed the case and remanded it
to the circuit court.
6 7
Although the ultimate issue rule did not appear applicable to
products liability actions, 8 the rule was abolished in federal courts
when the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted.' Four rea-
sons have been suggested as to why the ultimate issue rule did
not work: (1) it was often impossible to distinguish between an
ultimate and non-ultimate fact; (2) it was often impossible for a
witness to couch his testimony in anything but an ultimate fact;
(3) the testimony cannot invade the province of the jury when
the jurors are free to draw their own conclusions; and (4) in those
courts which allowed testimony on ultimate facts but not on is-
sues of law, it was often impossible to separate one from another. 70
Hollingsworth is important to Mississippi jurisprudence in two
respects. First, the court has properly joined the significant majori-
ty of states that recognize the development of accident reconstruc-
tion as a science and the benefit to be gained from this type of
evidence.71 Second, Hollingsworth opens the door for a complete
analysis on the merits of the seat belt defense in Mississippi.
64. 465 So. 2d 311 (Miss. 1985).
65. Id. at 313.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Early-Gary Inc. v. Walters, 294 So. 2d 181 (Miss. 1974) (testimony by expert in ceramic
engineering that an injury was caused by a defect in a ketchup bottle held not to invade the province of the jury).
69. FED. R. EVID. 704 reads as follows: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise inad-
missible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Addition-
ally, the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, modeled on the Federal Rules of Evidence, were adopted by order
of the Mississippi Supreme Court on September 24, 1985, effective January I, 1986.
70. J. WEINSTEIN, 3 WEINSTEIN'S EvIDENCE § 704[011 at 704-4, 5 (1982).
71. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. See also Hagan Storm Fence Co. v. Edwards, 245 Miss.
487, 148 So. 2d 693 (1963) (Jones, J., dissenting). Dissenting in Hagan, Justice Jones had the following to
say: "if trial by jury in automobile accident cases is to accomplish its objectives, the law must take a more
enlightened outlook on the problem of admissibility of expert opinions and other scientific, objective data relating
to the laws of motion." Id. at 496, 148 So. 2d at 696.
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MANDATORY SEAT BELT USAGE LEGISLATION
Under the authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966,72 the Secretary of Transportation is authorized
to issue motor vehicle safety standards. Pursuant to this authority,
an administrative ruling from the Secretary of Transportation will
require automobile manufacturers to install airbags or automatic
seat belts in all new automobiles if the Secretary determines by
not later than April 1, 1989, that two-thirds of the population of
the states are not subject to mandatory seat belt use laws." The
response to the federal mandate has generated more uncertainty
in an already unsettled area of tort law.
At the time of this writing fourteen states had enacted manda-
tory seat belt use laws." All of the laws require seat belts to be
worn by all front seat passengers. Excluded from this require-
ment are vehicles that make frequent stops such as postal carri-
ers. However, the statutes do not apply to those children who by
law are required to utilize child restraint devices.75 In addition,
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
73. The minimum criteria for state mandatory safety belt usage laws are:
(a) Require that each front seat occupant of a passenger car equipped with safety belts under Stan-
dard No. 208 has a safety belt properly fastened about his or her body at all times when the vehicle
is in forward motion.
(b) If waivers from the safety belt usage requirement are to be provided, permit them for medical
reasons only.
(c) Provide for the following enforcement measures:
(I) A penalty of not less than $25.00 (which may include court costs) for each occupant of a
car who violates the seat belt usage requirement.
(2) A provision specifying that the violation of the seat belt usage requirement may be used
to mitigate damages with respect to any person who is involved in a passenger car accident while violating
the belt usage requirement and who seeks in any subsequent litigation to recover damages for injuries
resulting from the accident. This requirement is satisfied if there is a rule of law in the state permitting
such mitigation.
(3) A program to encourage compliance with the belt usage requirement.
(d) An effective date of not later than September 1, 1989.
Id.
74. 1985 Conn. Acts 85-429 (Reg. Sess.) (effective January 1, 1986); HAWAn REV. STAT. § 291 (1985)
(effective December 16, 1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95.5 § 12-603.1 (1985) (effective July I, 1985); 1985
Mo. Legis. Serv. S. Bill No. 43 (effective July I, 1985); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 39-669.26 (1985) (effective Sep-
tember 6, 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-76.2e et seq. (West 1985) (effective March I, 1985); 1985 N.M.
Laws 131 (effective July 1, 1986); N.Y. VEIL. & TRAF. LAW § 383 (McKinney 1985) (effective January 1,
1985); 1985 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 20-135.2A (effective October 1, 1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 12-417
(1985) (effective February 1, 1987); TEX. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art 67 (old) § 107c (1985) (effective Septem-
ber I, 1985). See also, NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.641 (1985) and 1985 Or. Laws Adv. Sh. No. 619 (1985).
Neither of these statutes are true seat belt laws under the 208 ruling. The Nevada law is tied to an increase
in the speed limit to 70 miles per hour. If the federal government does not penalize Nevada in the form of
reduced highway funds the safety belt law will apply. The Oregon law only applies to front seat occupants
aged sixteen and under.
75. In Mississippi the child restraint law is codified in Mtss. CODE ANN. § 63-7-301 (Supp. 1985) which
provides:
Every person transporting a child under the age of two (2) years in a motor vehicle required to be
registered . . .and operated on the roadways, streets or highways of this state shall provide for the
protection of the child by properly using a child passenger restraint device or system meeting applica-
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exceptions are generally allowed for medical reasons. But, the
similarity of the statutes ends when the issue of noncompliance
arises.
Five general approaches have been adopted for treating non-
compliance. Illinois specifically prohibits the seat belt defense as
evidence of negligence or as a factor in mitigation of damages."6
In Michigan a violation can be considered evidence of negligence
and mitigation of damages is allowed, but only to the extent that
damages are not reduced by greater than five percent of the recov-
ery.77 Missouri treats the issue as Michigan does; however, miti-
gation is only allowed to reduce the damages award by a maximum
of one percent."8 The New Jersey statute does not change exist-
ing rules or laws as they pertain to civil damages. 9 New York,
the state with the most liberal statute, prohibits the defense as it
applies to liability but allows the defense for mitigation of damages
without imposing a ceiling on the amount that can be mitigated."0
In light of the existing case law, the provisions on noncompli-
ance have a bizarre effect on the seat belt defense. As the defense
evolved courts uniformly held that since there were no statutes
requiring the use of available seat belts the failure to wear one
could not be negligence per se."1 Now that fourteen states have
adopted mandatory usage laws there is an express duty to wear
an available belt, and a violation of the statute is conclusive evi-
dence of unreasonable conduct.
Illinois, a state traditionally allowing the defense,82 now pro-
hibits the defense" despite the fact that a violation would be un-
reasonable conduct in an ordinary violation of statute. Although
no legislative history was found, it appears the plaintiffs' bar ef-
fectively lobbied for the provision and gained a favorable posi-
tion by the passage of the statute.
ble federal motor vehicle safety standards. Failure to provide and use a child passenger restraint device
or system shall not be considered contributory or comparative negligence.
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95.5 § 12-603.1(9)(c) (1985). See also 1985 Conn. Acts 85-429 § 4 (Reg. Sess.);
IND. CODE § 9-8-14-5 (1985); 1985 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 20-135.2A(d); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 12-417(5)
(1985); and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67 (old) § 107c(j) (1985).
77. Mich. S. Bill No. 6 (5) (1985). See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.26(7) (1985).
78. 1985 Mo. Legis. Serv. S. Bill No. 43 § 3(2). See also 1985 La. Acts 377 § 295.1E (allowing maximum
of two per cent mitigation).
79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-76.2e(4) (West 1985). See also HAWAtI REV. STAT. § 291 (1985) and 1985
N.M. Laws 131 (Neither statute addressed the issue of mitigation of damages).
80. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 383(8) (McKinney 1985).
81. See, e.g., Insurance Co., supra note 46.
82. See generally Wagner v. Zboncak, Il I l. App. 3d 268, 443 N.E.2d 1085 (1982) (holding evidence
of the use or nonuse of seat belts is limited only as to the issue of damages; it does not reach the issue of
contributory negligence or the defendant's negligence); Mount v. McClellan, 91 Ill. App. 2d I, 234 N.E.2d
329 (1968).
83. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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To the contrary, Michigan and Missouri now treat the failure
to wear an available seat belt as negligence per se and allow miti-
gation of damages.' This is definitely a reversal of the prior Michi-
gan position" and also appears to be a departure from prior
Missouri law as well. 6 New Jersey law was initially unsettled; 7
therefore, it is unclear what effect the new law will have in that
state. New York's statute is consistent with prior case law. Not
only is the defense admissible for mitigation of damages, it also
is not subject to a limitation on the amount by which damages
can be reduced.8
Fortunately, the balance of the statutes are basically consistent,
or at least do not conflict with prior case law. No cases on point
were found in Hawaii or Nebraska. The Connecticut Supreme
Court has recently held that the general state of the defense is
unsettled in Connecticut.8 Indiana's seat belt law follows its ju-
dicial precedent by holding evidence of nonuse inadmissible."
Louisiana law is unsettled; however, two opinions appear to favor
admissibility of the defense on the issue of mitigation. 1 Thus,
a five percent maximum for mitigation under the Louisiana stat-
ute would not seem inconsistent. Although New Mexico does not
address mitigation in its statute, the defense has not been allowed
in that state. 2 Similarly, despite admissibility under exceptional
circumstances, the defense in North Carolina is generally inad-
missible. " Oklahoma" and Texas" also deny the defense as a factor
in mitigation of damages.
84. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
85. See Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969) (inadmissible to mitigate
damages).
86. In the only case found in Missouri, Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970), the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals, applying Illinois law, held the defense inadmissible to mitigate damages; however,
the court appeared to approve of the outcome.
87. In Barry v. Coca-Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273 (1976), the court held a defense of
contributory negligence was not sufficient to bar a recovery. Although the court denied the defense, it recognized
that it was not addressing what the outcome would be if expert testimony had been available. id. at 280. See
also Polyard v. Terry, 148 N.J. Super. 202, 372 A.2d 378 (1977) (the court holding the defense had not been
established in the state and the instant case was not the appropriate case to declare the rule).
88. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
89. Delott v. Rosaback, 179 Conn. 406, 426 A.2d 791 (1980). But see Tempe v. Giacco, 186 Conn. Supp.
120, 442 A.2d 947 (1981) (allowing the defense in exceptional circumstances).
90. State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 1981).
91. See Fontenot v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 217 So. 2d 702 (La. Ct. App. 1969) and Becnel v. Ward,
286 So. 2d 731 (La. Ct. App. 1973). Both cases contain language favorable to the seat belt defense under
a proper evidentiary record.
92. Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 88 N.M. 579, 544 P.2d 719 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975).
93. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
94. No appellate court in Oklahoma has held the defense inadmissible in a personal injury case; however,
two federal courts, construing Oklahoma law have ruled the defense inadmissible for contributory negligence.
Woods v. Smith, 296 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Fla. 1969); Henderson v. United States, 429 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.
1976).
95. Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. 1974).
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The limit on the amount by which damages can be reduced may
prove to be a serious deterrent to the practical usefulness of the
seat belt defense. Those jurisdictions that have accepted the seat
belt defense have required a seat belt expert to establish the causal
connection between the injury sustained and the nonuse of the seat
belt. 6 Considering the expenses involved in securing the expert
and the time involved for the attorney to prepare a seat belt argu-
ment for trial, it is questionable whether the effort would be cost
effective when the maximum realization is a one or two percent
reduction in damages. The result could be worth the effort under
the right circumstances in Michigan or Nebraska where mitiga-
tion of five percent of the damages is allowed. However, in Loui-
siana, Michigan, Missouri, and Nebraska it would seem that the
defense would only be worth pursuing in those cases which in-
volve a potential million dollar liability.
In Mississippi, a mandatory seat belt bill, number HB807, in-
troduced by Representative Margaret Tate of Picayune, was de-
feated by the House Transportation Committee on February 5,
1985. William J. McCoy, Vice Chairman of the House Trans-
portation Committee suggested two reasons for the bill's defeat.
First, the threat of the federal mandate concerned the committee.
Second, committee members felt it would be beneficial to see how
similar bills are treated by other states that adopt such legisla-
tion. 7 While both reasons are not without merit, the mandatory
seat belt laws now existing in fourteen states provide the needed
examples for our legislature to consider in order to adopt a safety
belt law in the next session.
CONCLUSION
That the seat belt defense has been denied in Mississippi solely
because of a lack of evidence as to the effectiveness and social
utility of seat belts is apparent from the language used in the Mis-
sissippi cases dealing with the defense. Today it is common
knowledge that the proper use of an available and fully opera-
tional seat belt plays a significant role in minimizing the effects
of automobile collisions."'
The time is ripe for the defense to be adopted in Mississippi,
preferably through legislative enactment. Legislation adopted at
the end of 1984, and in the first eight months of 1985, has im-
96. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
97. Jackson Daily News, Feb. 6, 1985 at col. 2.
98. See supra notes 1-4.
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posed an express duty to wear seat belts in fourteen states. Sure-
ly more states will soon become a part of this trend. And, in order
to comply with the federal mandate, as currently written, a miti-
gation of damages provision will be necessary.
Should the legislature fail to adopt a seat belt law in the next
session, the judicial evolution of the seat belt defense provides
a basis for admitting evidence of safety belt nonuse. With the
abolition of the ultimate issue rule in Mississippi state courts,
causal connection, long the missing element in seat belt defense
cases, can be established. In any event, defendants should not be
held liable for those injuries to a plaintiff that could have been
prevented had a seat belt been in use. But more importantly,
through increased usage of automobile safety belts, needless loss
of life will be avoided in Mississippi.
Granville Tate, Jr.

